

1. The Kanazawa University International Award is a very great honor for me and, I think, an encouragement for all scholars who contribute to the field of Suzuki Daisetsu studies and Nishida studies. To receive this award in the city of Kanazawa, where Suzuki Daisetsu and Nishida Kitarō attended the Ishikawa Fourth High School, is very special to me. I am deeply grateful to Award Selection Committee and to all those whose efforts made this award possible. During my years on Japan, many supported my studies, from university professors to families who befriended me and my wife. I am deeply grateful to all these people. After four decades, I still feel as if I have barely scratched the surface of the profound thinking of Suzuki and Nishida. But already I dare to venture ahead and envision some ways that Nishida *tetsugaku* might contribute to understanding contemporary problems that he himself did not face. So today I would like to present some thoughts about the promise of Nishida philosophy.

2. But first, please allow me some autobiographical remarks that tell you how I first came to know of Suzuki Daisetsu and Nishida Kitarō. You see, when I was a college student in Washington D.C., in the early 1960s, I took courses in philosophy and religion, but only in Western philosophy and Christian religion. I had no exposure to Eastern traditions. I continued my studies of phenomenology and philosophy of religion in graduate school at the University of Munich, again, with little knowledge of Eastern traditions or languages. Although I read the names Kuki Shūzō and Nishida Kitarō in a “Dialogue on Language” by Martin Heidegger, I found nothing by them I could read. Then a fortuitous event occurred. Some fellow foreign students told me that I should read the poet Bashō, D. T. Suzuki about Zen, and the book *Zen in the Art of Archery* by Eugen Herrigel. I read these authors and was amazed.

3. I sensed a deep connection to embodied knowing and everyday life—realities that were neglected in the cerebral philosophy and theology I had been studying. To say these books intrigued me would be an understatement. I decided that after earning a PhD I would try to go to Japan. Then another fortuitous event: Enomiya-Lassalle, a Jesuit priest as well as a Zen teacher, came to Munich and gave a lecture about Zen. I brought my wish to him, and he helped me secure a position at Sophia University. My job was to teach philosophy in English, in the International Division of the University, and to translate books about Buddhism by Heinrich Dumoulin, a historian of Zen. And soon I learned a little more about Suzuki and Nishida.

4. Let me back up a bit, to convey to you something about my first experiences of being in Japan, in 1971, or rather, about my lack of experience. I arrived only one month after getting married, and neither my wife nor I knew any Japanese at all. We felt we were suddenly transported to a different world, the megapolis of Tokyo with its 20 million people. We had grown up in small cities in Wyoming and Indiana. In Tokyo we were like small children who could not yet read, and in those days there were few if any signs in romaji. Once we ventured into a restaurant that did not have any wax models of its food; we could read absolutely nothing on the menu given us. Another time, we started to enter a tiny eatery near Ogikubō station; we ducked under the curtain and the men behind a counter started yelling at us. We were so surprised that left immediately, thinking that we did not belong there. What were the men shouting? We learned later: “Irrashai Irrashai! (Welcome! Come on in!) So inexperienced were we. But the people in Tokyo were nevertheless always kind and helpful. Later, thanks to friends in the Izu Shimoda, we were able to live in the beautiful countryside near the ocean, and one time they it possible for us to attend language classes at a local middle school. You can image the strange sight of an adult foreign couple going to school along with the young students all in their uniforms.

5. In the meantime, while teaching at Sophia University I had learned a little about Nishida Kitarō. It was said that Nishida’s philosophy was deeply inspired by Zen. This was somewhat of a welcome surprise, since I had the impression from Suzuki that Zen transcended rational thinking, whereas philosophy was supposed to be the exercise of rational thinking. The scant experience I had of Zen practice, at a single *sesshin* at the dōjō (called *Shinmeikutsu*) of Father Lassalle, confirmed that Zen in practice had little if anything to do with philosophical thinking. So, I asked in anticipation, what in the world would a Zen philosopher be like? Several years later I had the good fortune of meeting two preeminent Zen philosophers, Nishitani Keiji sensei and Ueda Shizuteru sensei, and I remain forever grateful for their patient guidance. Before meeting them, however, I began to read Nishida’s *Inquiry into the Good*. After a three-year stay in Japan, I still had not learned to read Japanese, but I found an English translation the summer I returned home for a visit. The library at a nearby California State University had the translation by Valdo Viglielmo with a Foreword by Suzuki Daisetsu titled “How to Read Nishida.” I eagerly read this translation and Suzuki’s advice. Through the years I continued to read Suzuki’s writings and occasionally to write evaluations of his pioneering work. For now, however, I would like to speak mainly about Nishida Kitarō and the promise I find in his philosophy.

6. You will recall that *Inquiry into the Good* is “a book that was written during my time teaching at the Fourth High School in Kanazawa.” As a philosophical work, the writing style was easy to understand, but the content was difficult to fathom. Yet I was inspired by new possibilities. In fact, my initial reaction was quite the opposite of the reaction reported by James Heisig when he spoke here at the occasion of the Kanazawa Award two years ago. Heisig said that reading *Inquiry into the Good* was “not at first a happy experience.” Heisig, however, was commenting about his reaction to the later chapters of Nishida’s book and its conception of God, whereas I am recalling my impression of reading the opening chapters about “pure experience.” At the time, I thought I had an immediate understanding of Nishida’s words—an understanding that nevertheless challenged the philosophy I had studied in Germany in new ways. My unhappy experience with Nishida’s philosophy came later, with attempts to read and understand the works that came after *Inquiry Into the Good*. I will return to that topic in a few minutes.

7. It was evident that Nishida’s notion of pure experience had been influenced by William James and the German psychologists he mentions, but it was also clear that Nishida developed the idea quite differently than they had. It can be said that, instead of leaving “pure experience” as a primitive, isolated idea, Nishida’s chapters propose how pure experience develops into thought and reflection and, indeed, a system of consciousness at the foundation of the entire world. What is more, this pure experience is said to manifest true reality prior to the distinction between an experiencing subject and an experienced object, and prior to the arising of an individual who experiences. But then the idea of pure experience challenged a basic thesis of phenomenology: if something is manifest, then it must be manifest to someone, and that someone is not only a recipient of the appearance, she or he is also an agent of manifestation. The terminology makes it sound difficult, but the idea is simple.

8. If you are not familiar with this notion, let me explain simply. In English, we speak of “awareness” and “being aware”; in German we speak of “Bewußtsein.” In Japanese we can speak of 「気づき」, 「覚知」, and 「目覚め」. Right now you are aware of my voice, and of the things you see around you, and perhaps of the chair you’re sitting in or the thoughts you have. Each of us is aware of the people and the things around us and of ourselves. Sometime we become aware of how our awareness misleads us, or of how we were unaware. But even then it is our awareness that opens to us the possibility of being wrong or of being unaware. For awareness to occur, there must, it seems, be someone who is aware and something of which one is aware. In phenomenology, awareness is “ground zero.”

In other words, behind every appearance—or rather in front of every appearance—stands a conscious being, and such conscious beings come in the form of individuals. That is, nothing is manifest without a personal consciousness. In contrast, Nishida’s idea of an experience that originally belongs to no one, of thoughts without a thinker, remains a promising but challenging idea for phenomenology.

9. My understanding of the first chapters of *Inquiry into the Good* has evolved over the decades. I would like to mention here my most recent insight into the idea of pure experience. Of course, pure experience is not an idea, but it does give rise to ideas, and as philosophers we reflect on those ideas and evaluate them. Recently I was re-reading the major work of Nishida’s disciple, Nishitani Keiji, the book called *What Is Religions?* I saw a deep connection to “pure experience” in Nishitani’s discussion of single-mindedness (一心). The Buddhist term *samādhi* (*sammai* in Japanese) is another name for this: the state of full attention or concentration. But it would be a mistake to take single-mindedness as a special state of mind, a psychological event or mental phenomenon confined to Buddhist practice. Rather, it is an everyday event that usually goes unnoticed. Nishitani calls it a “mode of being”, and says that this mode “realizes reality itself.” I think this expression is close to Nishida’s idea “to explain all things on the basis of pure experience” as the one, unifying reality. Further, Nishitani speaks of the “self-awareness of reality” that is “both our becoming aware of reality and, at the same time, reality realizing itself in our awareness” We will need to return to the topic of self-awareness (*jikaku* 自覚) later; “Inquiry Into the Good” itself does not mention this seminal theme so important for Nishida philosophy. But Nishitani’s words suggest the direction that Nishida took: the personal awareness that, for phenomenologists, manifests phenomena is, at the same time, an awareness that belongs to the world. And so “reality” is not simply what we endeavor to “appropriate through understanding”; it is what actualizes and fulfills us.

10. In reading Nishitani, I came to appreciate Nishida’s early philosophy better, and to understand the continuity of his thought. Fifty years after Nishida’s first work, Nishitani wrote of “reality realizing itself” through our self-awareness. Twenty-five years after *Inquiry into the Good*, Nishida put the point differently: our interaction with the world, our “performative intuition (行為的直観),” actualizes us and the world. Perhaps I can illustrate these rather abstract ideas with a concrete example. The children we bring into the world are, in some sense, created by us and continue to mature into themselves through our interactions with them, just as we become who we are through

our interactions with them. How we act toward others affects them and their Umwelt but also affects who we become.

11. The translations of works of Nishida that I read after *Inquiry into the Good* often perplexed me. *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness* seemed like a cascade of divergent ideas instead of a development of a unifying pure experience. The English translation of *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* nearly threw me into despair. I felt a great frustration trying to comprehend ideas like “contradictory self-identity” and “self-aware dialectical universal.” Even if I may have some comprehension of terms like this now, I often feel that they need fresh translations, or paraphrasing that can make them understandable to students trained in classical Western philosophy. It may be that I am now able to read and understand, to some degree at least, “Nishida philosophy” without relying on translations. Yet I feel that the process of translation can awaken us from the pretense that merely repeating Nishida’s terms will produce understanding. It is easy to fall into a repetition of Nishida’s language and to be mesmerized by his terms, or literal translations of them, without truly understanding. Our explanations and translations of “Nishida philosophy,” I think, need to be more active. There is a saying in Italian, “traduttore, traditore,” that means: translators are traitorous. But I wonder if we might say instead that translators transfer and enable wider understanding. Translators today, like Yusa Michiko who converts Nishida into English and Jacynthe Trembley who renders his thought into French, are well aware of the challenges and the rewards of this task.

12. Books by scholars today are supposed to be continuous and cohesive treatments. Nishida’s works, on the other hand, are collections of essays, each of which may take up a matter again and again and rework his thought. Some were published serially in philosophical journals. *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness* was published over four years in 44 installments. I am still learning how to read these works—to read them thoughtfully and critically, piece by piece, with background study of his references. This year, some scholars from several countries have been explaining the scientific side of Nishida’s thinking in their articles for a forthcoming volume called “Modern Physics and the Kyoto School.” For example, Rossella Lupacchini has discovered hidden references to mathematics in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness*, and taught me to notice Nishida’s essays on mathematics written just one year before he died. I have learned much about the reciprocal influence between Nishida and the Nobel Prize Laureate, physicist Yukawa Hideki. In fact, Nishida was instrumental in getting Einstein to come to Japan in 1922. Nishida was conversant with quantum theory as well as the theory of relativity, and his diagrams in

*Fundamental Problems of Philosophy* depict individuals as finite parts or quanta of an infinite whole. The work by these scholars promises to recover the deep relationship between Nishida-philosophy and the history of modern physics. As Jacynthe Tremblay pointed out elsewhere, modern physics confirmed Nishida's conviction that "knowing does not mean capturing a faithful, passive representation of an objective reality separate from the subject." Contemporary epistemology and popular views of science need to recognize that knowing is a matter of interaction, and both we researchers and the world we study are actors.

13. Let me now jump ahead to a theme in Nishida philosophy that I think holds great promise.

I confess that I have been fascinated by Nishida's idea of a self-aware world. But I think that this unusual idea not only helps solve a philosophical problem; it also has consequences for the current ecological crisis. I begin with some conclusions Nishida reached by the end of his life, as they are condensed in his essay "自覚について(On Self-Awareness)" written in 1943. He starts with what we place at the center of all things when, for example, we describe the Big Bang or the formation of planet earth as leading up to now, to us here and now, to the presence that we are, that each of us is. He begins with the self, the self that is a center of awareness, is self-aware while being aware of others and things in the world. This self in act cannot be grasped as an object. From this active center, each of us can assume a standpoint, take a position or have a perspective on things and take account of them. But then Nishida adds a remark that turns our head around: "Nishida wrote: "That is why the self, as something that acts, is something to be reflected upon from the standpoint of world....[We] must take up the standpoint of the self-awareness of the creative self, the self that brings forth....philosophy proceeds not from the self, but from the world. For what we call the self, as something that acts, is reflected on from the standpoint of the world." What could this possibly mean?

14. Nishida's proposed standpoint does not describe the world of things "objectively," from a third-person point of view—the perspective aimed at in the empirical sciences. Rather, he insists on first-person viewpoints. First-person viewpoints come from self-awareness and allow for someone to take responsibility for what one says, especially when one makes truth claims. Nishida's "standpoint of the world" is not a perspective on the self from outside any self. In context, he does imply that the world is not something outside ourselves and we are not outside the world. For our selves, even as we reflect and find ourselves already here, are actively engaged with others and with things within the world. Unlike Descartes, Nishida understands self as embodied, conditioned by the world but also creative of it; there's no such thing as an "external world." Now,

phenomenologists also show how selves are embodied beings in the world. Nishida stresses even more that self is that which takes action. Self is not only placed in the world but is also performative of the world in what it does and creates. Here we find deep resonances with *enaction theory* in the cognitive sciences today. “Enaction” means that “we assign meaning to the environment through physical actions,” but Nishida's perspective is that this environment also determines human beings through their bodies and their history.

15. To come back to Nishida's words, I hear him saying that the ego self has to be understood from the standpoint of world,—has to be understood *as* an interactive part of the world. But we need to say more than he does about the meaning of “world.” Nishida's concern is to re-prioritize the elements of awareness so that a greater implicated whole takes precedence over subjective acts and the objects targeted by them. This implicated whole is the primary sense of *world* here.

In modern philosophy, *world* can refer to the totality of all there is, or to all of *nature*, or to the horizon of experience, or an emergent and interactive network of signification. Modern philosophy posits the subjective side of experience and the objective side of reality; Nishida rejects this split, two-sided worldview. The primary meaning of *world* for him is the lived, concrete whole that provides the context of experiential reality. The expression “standpoint of the world” expresses the world precisely *as* an overarching place within which selves take their place, rather than the world as some entity that “has a standpoint or perspective on things.” World as comprehensive place expresses a unity that is reflected in myriad selves.

16. Nishida stretches our imagination even further when he speaks of world as “self-aware,” even if in a reciprocal way. He writes, “When the world becomes self-aware, the self becomes self-aware. And when our self becomes self-aware, the world becomes self-aware.” Once again, this statement jars with usual ways of speaking about the world. After all, the word *world* almost never means something that can have its own awareness, whether it refers to the totality of all there is, or to all of *nature*, or to a horizon of experience or network of signification. Nishida does provide a hint of what he means when he describes the structure of the world. Let's pay attention to some details of his description. In Japanese, the expression *jikaku* 自覚 (“to be self-aware”) can mean to realize or acknowledge something. For example, one realizes the responsibility one has, or realizes that one is a member of society. This meaning presupposes that one is aware of oneself. The self is— or I am—self-aware in the sense that my consciousness manifests the world and presents things to me, individually and most often prior to reflection. If self-awareness is to be an awareness of more than merely oneself, it cannot be interior to the self alone. Self-awareness seems interior,

inside us, but somehow it must reach the exterior too. To solve that problem, modern European epistemology split the world in two, mind and nature, and then saw the mind as a mirror of nature, and ideas as representations of real objects. Nishida's solution is to see the world as mirroring itself in all the things "in the world." And whatever is "in the world" is a mirroring of the world. In this sense the world is "self-aware" or self-reflexive; and there is no outside to it. The world's structure is like that of an infinite set that is reflected in its parts, but never totally. An individual's "self-awareness" is a partial mirroring of the world.

17. There is one more factor to consider in Nishida's explanation. To explain how we come to know reality, we need to understand the role of self-negation. Nishida says that the world reflecting itself within itself must involve self-negation. At this point, let me try once again to give a concrete example of Nishida's vision. The "world" (*sekai* 世界) of course is more than social relations (*seken* 世間), but perhaps we may understand his point by thinking of ordinary human relationships. Think again of our relation with the children we bring into the world. They reflect us and we are reflected in them. But then, in opening themselves up to others they negate that limited identity, and we let them grow—and we ourselves grow—by negating our need to manage them. This is a process of mutual self-negation, of identity that grows by "contradicting" what it was. Self lost is a greater self gained.

18. Nishida also describes the self as a focal point of the world. The talk of reflecting, mirroring, and focal points are, of course, optical metaphors. But Nishida is also talking about reflecting as thinking, and awareness as being conscious. Awareness is the power that lets things appear and be manifest. Earlier I mentioned how some phenomenologists think of consciousness as what lets things appear. And there must be someone to whom things appear—that's what phenomenologists call the "dative of manifestation." And we must also be ones who enable the appearances or manifestations—we must be agents of manifestation. So what is the case with a world that somehow is aware? To speak like this would imply that world is somehow a power that lets things be manifest. A *self-aware world* functions such that it allows itself to be manifest and known—but to whom or to what? Is world a "dative of manifestation"—manifest to itself—as well as an agent of manifestation? Nishida's world is neither an agent that could bring about an effect, nor a passive object brought about by actors outside it; it is rather a "place" (*basho* 場所) of mediation. This is where the metaphor of focal points comes into play. We aware selves are the points, the places, in which world becomes aware. The world for Nishida is not a singular agent independent of selves.

And selves are not aworldly singularities independent of one another or of a world that appears through them. What is at stake is a certain reciprocity between world and selves.

19. Nishida's world and self are not the same, but neither are they independent. For one thing, world is singular but there's a plurality of selves. For another thing, the one world works through the plurality of selves, each of which expresses the world in its own way. I like to use another metaphor to make Nishida's point. We are the world's eyes, and not only eyes but ears and fingers and other sensitive organs, and in our own special ways we channel what the world has to say.

Now, this may sound like the height of anthropomorphizing, imagining that the whole world takes the form of a human self. But we could also see the matter in the reverse direction. Nishida repeats one phrase like a musical motif to describe the self. The self is that which acts, that which can take action freely and creatively. The self is defined by its working in the world, by performing the world, as it were. It is more than an embodied self; it is a *enworlded* self that takes place within the world and is infused and defined by its relation to all others in a totality. As a focal point of world, the self takes on the forms of the world, forming the world reciprocally and actively. If we channel what the world has to say, so to speak, we can also respond selfishly, bending or distorting it, refracting it rather than reciprocating. Here I see the beginning of the ecological relevance and promise of Nishida's standpoint.

20. But just who is this "we"? My metaphors and Nishida's expressions sound anthropocentric. He is clearly talking about human beings—all of them together—in a sense abstracted from social, cultural, and historical differentiations. He does emphasize that human selves are the very beings who make, and are made by, histories, cultures, societies, bodies; and there too he speaks reciprocally of the "historical body," "historical nature," and the "historical world." This world is threefold, or three-dimensional in a special sense: the historical world encompasses the less inclusive biological sphere, which in turn encompasses the least inclusive physical realm that science calls "nature." The three "dimensions" are levels of description, with historical and embodied as the most concrete, and physical as the most abstract. Again, the idea is that a comprehensive account of the world must internally include the possibility of providing accounts, in other words, it must include the possibility of self-awareness. Nishida's philosophy attempts to make sense of the world we live in and the living world that finds expression in us.

21. But now it's time to pause for a minute to take stock of what I've presented. After all, rigorous, critical philosophy demands that we base our ideas on evidence and valid reasons, not simply

represent a worldview. But Nishida's philosophy is not based on scientific evidence. A common assumption in the sciences is that valid scientific verification requires detached observers who do not participate in the world they investigate. This is a dualistic account of the world that separates the knower from the known. Nishida rejects the dualistic account. Some contemporary scientists also challenge that account. For example, the physicist Karen Barad understands the universe as comprised of phenomena that are inseparable interacting agents. "Phenomena or objects do not precede their interaction, rather, [they] emerge through particular intra-actions....Nothing is inherently separate from anything else, but separations are temporarily enacted so one can examine something long enough to gain knowledge about it." Her proposal is "a way of understanding the politics, ethics, and agencies of any act of observation, and indeed any kind of knowledge practice."

22. As is well known, Nishida developed a notion of knowing that exemplifies reciprocity and occurs *by way of doing*. Scientific experimentation is one of his examples of what he calls "performative or enactive intuition." It requires a displacement of the self-centered self that would one-sidedly act upon things, rather than interact with them. Bodily, historical selves can know themselves as integral to the world they help create, and can know world by interacting within it. One critical test of Nishida's philosophy would be its power to expose hidden assumptions. Another would be a framework to guide questions of empirical research. A third would be the power of his words to get us to see and to act more responsively and responsibly.

23. We may clarify Nishida's philosophy further by contrasting his standpoint with other philosophical and popular positions. Consider Nishida's statement about one reciprocity:

When world realizes self-awareness, our self realizes self-awareness. And when our self realizes self-awareness, world realizes self-awareness." And now, in contrast, consider a statement by the physicist Alan Lightman: "Nature has given us big brains, allowing us to build microscopes and telescopes and ultimately...to conclude that it's all just atoms and molecules..." This statement, apparently like Nishida's, speaks non-dualistically of the order of all things. But what is left out of Lightman's picture is the "mind" or consciousness that manifests the world and that concludes what it is. Lightman soon enough implies this subjective side when he ends his statement with these words "it's all just atoms and molecules. Or so I believe. I know this intellectually, yet I recoil from the idea."

24. Nishida is attempting to answer the question: what must world be in order for conscious, acting beings to exist? Some physicists, writing today for a popular audience, have answered this question

by reimagining the physical universe. Brian Swimme, for example, writes that “we are the self-reflection of the universe. We allow the universe to know and feel itself. So the universe is aware of itself through self-reflexive mind, which unfurls in the human.” Swimme presents an inspired and optimistic cosmology, but, understandably, he does not take account of humans acting, for better or worse, socially and culturally. The quantum theorist David Bohm proposed that the universe is an undivided wholeness he called the Implicate Order, in which “everything is enfolded into everything.” In an astonishing parallel to Nishida, Bohm wrote that “because of human participation, the ‘Implicate Order is getting to know itself better’ and the individual is the focus for something beyond mankind.” But Nishida connects more closely to human existence in his account of performative consciousness or awareness. And he takes account of interhuman activity and culture. He has layered the world of “nature” within the world of life and that in turn within the historically created world. What the “physical sciences” call *nature* he considers the most abstract, least inclusive of this three-dimensional world. Another contrast is with the physicist J.A. Wheeler. Wheeler proposed a “participatory universe,” in which “the facticity of physics is related to [the] particular position of human beings in the world, such that this world allows them to produce its own explication and description.”

25. Typically, however, the sciences see consciousness as a product of the natural world. And at the other extreme, idealist philosophies see the world as a “product” of our consciousness. Nishida’s philosophy offers an alternative, a more interactive view. This alternative contrasts with the scientific attitude in another way. The natural sciences typically seek a single true explanation of how things work. In contrast, a philosophy that recognizes a plurality of the centers of awareness leads us to appreciate a diversity of viewpoints. That diversity may be just as crucial to ecological balance as biodiversity is. The ecological relevance of Nishida philosophy may need to be developed much more, but the promise is visible.

26. There is one final potential I would like to mention. It too concerns the relevance of Nishida philosophy for a well-rounded view of the world. Earlier I mentioned the latent anthropocentrism in my interpretation of Nishida: the emphasis on human selves as focal points of the world. The ecological crisis we now face may be due in part to such anthropocentrism. So we may ask: What is the place of animals in Nishida’s vision? Animals are also aware beings who have their own kinds of languages and cultures; animals learn as well as react, create and teach as well as undergo. In some of his essays, Nishida almost recognizes animals as history-making beings. And, to a certain extent, he also attributes enactive intuition to animals as well as humans. For a philosopher

writing 87 years ago, this is remarkable. To be sure, Nishida did follow the convention of his day in stating that animals acted by instinct rather than out of freely creative actions. Human beings also exhibit instinctual behavior, but, importantly, humans are capable of freedom from bodily instinctual behavior, a freedom to create. Perhaps it is a matter of degree.

27. Current ethological research has challenged the assumption that animal behavior is governed largely by instinct, and some philosophers have challenged the notion that most human actions are initiated by freely formed, conscious intentions. These ideas would link humans and other animals in a continuum. In one essay of 1938, Nishida presents animal being in sharp contrast with human being, but his contrast also connects them. Nishida says that animal instinctual life is already enactive-intuitive. This startling statement is plausible if we recall that, for Nishida, it is the world as well as the individual that acts. The world acts via the individual. The instinctive life of animals also expresses the world's activity and remakes the world. The "expressive activity" (表現作用) of animals and humans means the power to create new phenomena and change the environment. Nishida also calls it "form-making," and describes it rather abstractly as a movement "from the made to the making." This power properly belongs to the world as well as to the individual animal or human. In my understanding, it is the power of "historical nature" to change, to grow, to create new forms, as this power is "expressed" in individual beings, animal and human. It is the individual's activity that is both conditioned by and creative of body and environment. The creative power of world, the totality that expands the scientific concept of nature, expresses itself in both animal be-ing and human be-ing. Nishida's formulations emphasize reciprocity: what is given provokes new activity which remakes the given; in more personal terms, we make things that in turn make us who we are. The world as "created" or already there is also a creative world, a world ever in the making.

28. Is it not possible that animals also count as "focal points of the world," as Nishida describes the human self? If so, they, too, must be respected as the world's eyes and ears, skin and antennae. These words function as a synecdoche for the manifold of sentience that opens the world to living beings. Yet that way of saying it is still only one-side of the story. The sensitivities of animals, human and nonhuman, function as ways the world knows itself, is opened to itself. The awareness that opens the world to itself belongs not merely to the human being but also to all beings capable of the world-making. Insofar as these beings are capable of expressing the world, they are history-making beings. The respect due them is critical; to deny them this respect is to live against the world, to put the earth in a state of crisis. This is the message I hear in Nishida's philosophy. As

you may recall, Karl Marx famously said, “philosophers have interpreted the world; the point is to change it.” Perhaps Nishida would say, if we now want to heal the world, we must heal ourselves.”

Be that as it may, I remain deeply grateful for Nishida’s insights and for your recognition today. I thank you for listening to a long and difficult lecture.

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